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Abstract
This article proposes a relational approach to the study of abortion law reform in Brazil. It focuses on the 
interaction of pro-choice and anti-abortion movements in different state arenas and political contexts. 
It details the emergence of a strategic action field on abortion during the Brazilian re-democratization 
process and the National Constituent Assembly. We offer analysis on pro-choice and anti-abortion 
mobilization in state arenas—mainly in the executive and legislative powers—during the two terms of 
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), 1995–1998 and 1999–2002, and the first term of President 
Luís Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula), 2003–2006. We then map political resources for mobilization, such as 
legislative bills, public policy norms, and judicial decisions, and track legal continuities and changes. 
Finally, we analyze anti-abortion reaction, which was consolidated through an increased conservative 
presence in congress after 2006, and discuss how the abortion debate has migrated from congress to the 
Supreme Court and the public sphere.
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Introduction   
Brazil’s penal code, drafted in 1940, states that abor-
tion is a crime and provides exceptions only when 
there is a risk to the woman’s health and in cases of 
rape. The political struggle for and against abortion 
rights dates back to the re-democratization process 
(1974-1985). During the transition process, the Na-
tional Constitutional Assembly (1986-1987) was the 
first important institutional stage where pro-choice 
and anti-abortion social movements disputed over 
abortion law reform. Since then, both movements 
have adopted new strategies to press their message, 
creating organizations and public campaigns, 
occupying government posts, proposing bills, par-
ticipating in public hearings, and filing court cases. 
The literature on political conflict and abor-
tion rights in Brazil has grown primarily over the 
last decade. There are many publications written by 
authors linked to pro-choice networks and public 
policies. They are descriptive, containing reports 
about the author’s perceptions of the political 
context.1 Another series of studies analyzes mo-
bilization and/or countermobilization in specific 
arenas, such as elections and courts.2 Finally, other 
scholars consider abortion as a case study of the 
relationship between religion and public debate or 
between political parties and churches.3 
The article intends to bring two contributions 
to the research on the Brazilian case. One is analyt-
ical: we analyze abortion law reform as a political 
process in a more integrated, relational, and dy-
namic way, according to the “contentious politics” 
perspective.4 We focus on social movements and 
counter-movements, their direct antagonists, as 
key collective actors to propel, or to block, politi-
cal, and legal reforms.5 As political actors, both are 
informal networks of relationships between orga-
nizations, groups, and individuals that are linked 
by political identities built around a political or 
cultural conflict.6 
The pro-choice movement aims to decrease 
or remove institutional, constitutional, or legal re-
strictions imposed on abortion. The anti-abortion 
movement aims to defend or increase such restric-
tions.7 Both are part of “strategic action fields”; that 
is, a socially constructed set of relations and arenas 
that sustain interactions of cooperation and con-
flict between heterogeneous actors around public 
agendas and problems.8 The contentious arenas are 
social spaces with different political resources and 
level of formalization of rules and codes of action 
and language, such as streets, media, courts, gov-
ernment, and technical agencies.9 The actors must 
adapt their tactics, frames, and alliances to differ-
ent arenas through which they circulate. Changes 
of arenas occur when they perceive opportunities 
for progress in achieving their goals or to provoke 
the public reverberation of their claims.    
Our analytical argument, therefore, is that the 
dispute over the regulation of abortion is not linear 
or fixed, but occurs in more or less institutionalized 
social spaces and involves non-state actors (femi-
nist movements and other social movements; trade 
unions; religious, medical and legal organizations, 
and health professionals); and state actors (state 
bureaucracies of public policy staff, members of 
congress, judges, and judicial officers). Mobiliza-
tion strategies and frames change according to the 
balance of political opportunities and restrictions, 
which in turn are constantly altered by the action 
of movements and counter-movements.10 The 
emergence of opponent movements tends to create 
conflict that requires adaptation of strategies to 
neutralize the effects of the opponent’s actions and 
push their respective agendas forward.11  
The state is a crucial part in the conflict and 
can be simultaneously a target of demands and an 
object of dispute. Depending on the institutional 
structure, the political regime and context, the 
state with its different arenas (such as congress, 
administrative agencies, courts) can take place 
in a contentious space. This occurs when public 
campaigns, the typical repertoire of action of social 
movements, enter the state and the world of insti-
tutionalized and routine politics, which acquires 
the form of, for example, lobbying for proposition 
of bills, occupying government posts, or proposing 
candidates in elections. In this sense, the conten-
tious politics occurs not only outside the state, 
such as in the form of outsiders’ protests, but can 
also occur within state arenas through the con-
nection between state and non-state actors. This 
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does not simply mean the institutionalization of 
social movements, but the activists’ ability to move 
through various arenas.12
The second contribution of the article is 
empirical. We focus on the pro-choice and an-
ti-abortion mobilization in the state arenas, mainly 
in the executive and legislative powers, during two 
government periods: the two terms of President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC), 1995–1998 
and 1999–2002, and the first term of President Luís 
Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula), 2003-2006. We ana-
lyze pro-choice and anti-abortion mobilization to 
frame their respective agendas through bills and 
administrative norms of public policy. We know 
that this is only a part of the political process that 
encompasses, for instance, street movements and 
mobilizations in court. But we argue that it is cru-
cial to reconstruct the mobilization in the executive 
and legislative powers in the two above-mentioned 
government periods, to understand the relationship 
between the movements and the state in Brazil, after 
the conclusion of the re-democratization process, 
and to explain the current state of affairs regarding 
sexual and reproductive rights today. 
The article shows how the FHC and Lula 
governments were permeable to the national and 
international pro-choice agenda. However, the 
balance of political opportunities and restrictions 
for the movement and the counter-movement had 
faced variations according to two key factors: the 
permeability of the government to the pro-choice 
movement and the political context as a whole. 
The close alliance between pro-choice groups and 
the executive branch during Lula’s administration, 
along with the political crisis, generated as backlash 
a new conservative reaction formed upon a close re-
lationship between congress and the anti-abortion 
movement’s network.
In the first section, we show briefly the emer-
gence of a contentious field on abortion related to 
the end of the Brazilian re-democratization pro-
cess that resulted in the installation of a National 
Constituent Assembly. In the second section, we 
compare the battle over abortion in FHC’s and Lu-
la’s governments. In the third section, we analyze 
the conservative reaction.  
Creating the abortion battleground in 
Brazil
At the end of the 1970s, the Brazilian feminist 
movement developed close ties with the domestic 
political opposition groups fighting against the 
military regime (led by left-wing activists and 
progressive sectors within the Catholic Church), 
and with international groups that had female au-
tonomy as a main piece of their political agenda.13 
Pro-choice mobilizations, although they did occur 
during Brazil’s political transition to democracy, 
were infrequent. Abortion was rejected not only by 
the church, but by left-wing activists who opposed 
liberal and individual evocation of autonomy and 
freedom of choice for women. Government agen-
cies resisted including abortion in their political 
agendas, and Catholics mobilized in protest when-
ever abortion became part of the national debate.14
The process of creating the new democratic 
constitution caused open disagreement between 
pro-choice activists and the church. The Brazilian 
National Constitutional Assembly (1986-1987) 
opened the national political arena to groups and 
movements mobilized during re-democratization 
under the broad umbrella of the anti-military re-
gime movement. In 1985, the first civilian president 
was elected, and the Constitutional Assembly, a year 
after, represented a unique political opportunity for 
groups and movements to focus their specific agen-
das and to claim normative and public legitimacy 
for them. Drafting the new constitution became a 
battleground for divergent interests among various 
groups and movements.15 
The polarizing topic of abortion was heavily 
discussed.16 Feminist leadership sent the “Carta das 
Mulheres” (Women’s Letter) to congress, outlining 
demands for items to be declared in the new consti-
tution, including the right to interrupt pregnancy. 
The counter-movement, led by the National Confer-
ence of Bishops of Brazil (CNBB) with the support 
of evangelical members of congress, pressed for the 
new constitution to include protection and right 
to life since conception.17 Amidst a clash with the 
Catholic Church, the feminists’ strategy was to at 
least prevent the inclusion of the protection of life 
since conception in the final wording of the Federal 
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Constitution of 1988, and they succeeded in that.18 
Without winners in the constitutional battle, the 
dispute was directed to the infra-constitutional 
regulation, signaling congress as a strategic space 
to promote political and legal changes. 
The constitutional definition of fundamental 
and social rights, especially the right to health, cre-
ated a new legal, moral, and political vocabulary that 
expanded the penal rhetoric that had governed the 
policies and laws on abortion in Brazil. The new con-
stitution also expanded the formal access of different 
interests to state arenas. In addition to free elections, 
councils were created in the executive sphere, and in 
the judiciary branch, new procedural instruments 
were put in place for the defense of rights.
On the international front, the UN world con-
ferences and its parallel forums became spaces for 
the formation of coalitions in transnational networks 
of feminist and human rights organizations.19 In the 
early 90s, feminist activists were intensely mobilized 
in the preparatory activities to the conferences. In 
September 1993, Brazilian activists held the National 
Meeting of Women and the Population, Our Rights 
for Cairo ‘94. The “Carta de Brasília” (Letter from 
Brasilia), resulted in discussion, included feminist 
demands related to non-coercion, women’s compre-
hensive health, and sexual and reproductive rights. 
Official delegations were also integrated by profes-
sionalized and globally connected organizations, 
such as CFEMEA (Centro Feminista de Estudos, e 
Assessoria) and CEPIA (Cidadania, Estudo, Pesqui-
sa, Informação, e Ação).20 The UN Conference on 
People and Development, which took place in Cairo 
in 1994, and the Fourth World Conference on Wom-
en, in Beijing in 1995, fueled the national pro-choice 
discourse framed in terms of human rights and the 
right to health.21  
The national pro-choice movement main-
tained two agendas: one more radical (claiming 
the decriminalization of abortion) and another 
more moderate (claiming the increase in instances 
of legal abortion). The second gained more force 
in the institutional battles, as it was more open to 
negotiations with governments and political elites. 
The national mobilization was supported by the 
formation, in 1991, of the Rede Nacional Feminista 
de Saúde e Direitos Reprodutivos (National Femi-
nist Network on Health and Reproductive Rights) 
for the “defense of comprehensive health for wom-
en and their sexual and reproductive rights” and 
for a public unified health system, “universal and of 
good quality, accessible to all women.”22 
The movement internalized the international 
framing of abortion as a public health issue, con-
necting movement, state, and global institutions.23 
Feminist leaders joined or aligned themselves 
with parties, thereby connecting the movement to 
institutional spaces. From the mid-1990s on, the 
pro-choice movement found its channels and access 
to the national executive branch during the FHC 
and Lula administrations. Both administrations 
were linked to political parties that had opposed 
the military regime and allowed female leaders to 
build alliances since the beginning of re-democ-
ratization. Both governments signed and ratified 
international treaties, established National Human 
Rights Plans (PNDH), created state bureaucracy 
specifically for women’s politics, and furthermore, 
placed feminist leaders in government positions. 
In this way, the executive branch in the 1990s and 
2000s was transformed into a political working 
arena for the pro-choice movement. 
The anti-abortion movement also renewed the 
social bases of activism. During the 1970s and 1980s, 
CNBB led the formation of groups and movements, 
recruiting from its network of Catholic dioceses. 
Pro-life groups were created as far back as the late 
1980s, but from the 1990s onward, the movement 
acquired its own structure connecting local groups 
to national and international networks. The first 
National Meeting of Pro-Life Movements took 
place in Brazil in 1992 with the support of Human 
Life International, an American organization of 
transnational anti-abortion activism, with partic-
ular focus on Latin America. In 1993, the National 
Pro-Life and Pro-Family Association was created, 
with the mission to defend “human life from con-
ception to natural death, without exceptions” and 
“the moral and ethical values of the family.” 
m. r. de assis machado and d. a. maciel  / Abortion and Human Rights, 119-131
   J U N E  2 0 1 7    V O L U M E  1 9    N U M B E R  1   Health and Human Rights Journal 123
Movements and counter-movements in the 
national state arenas (1995-2006)
In the national state arenas, the battle over abortion 
from 1995 to 2006 took place mainly in the legis-
lative branch (through bills) and in the executive 
branch (through administrative norms for public 
policy). Although there are reports of litigation in 
individual cases beginning to be used in the 1990s 
in Brazil, the mobilization toward the judiciary in 
the dispute during the analyzed period was resid-
ual. A legal strategy was built only in 2004 in the 
initial action that brought to the Supreme Court a 
case involving the interruption of pregnancy of an 
anencephalic fetus.24 Later, two contentious public 
hearings took place in the Federal Supreme Court 
(STF), one in 2007 on a biosafety law and another 
in 2008 on the case involving the interruption of 
pregnancy of an anencephalic fetus.25
When social organizations, groups, and 
movements adopt a strategy to move a dispute from 
the public sphere to institutional arenas, they must 
often rely on alliances with different state actors 
(such as members of congress, public defenders, or 
prosecutors). Mobilization in state arenas depends, 
therefore, on how receptive such actors are to social 
claims. Also, the political resources available for 
mobilization in institutional arenas—bills, admin-
istrative norms, and judicial decisions—are not 
identical, because of varying degrees of coercive 
compliance and stability to consolidate political 
and legal changes.
Different regulatory compositions can be 
activated depending on the institution, issue, and 
context of political opportunities. In the compo-
sition of norms governing a certain subject, there 
is a structural definition of what can be regulated 
by what kind of norm, and the limits of these rules 
are also regulated. For example, altering the penal 
code to create the possibility for legal abortion 
should occur through a legislative amendment or 
a Supreme Court decision that can invalidate or 
interpret a piece of federal legislation. Technical 
norms, issued by the federal, state, or municipal 
executives, standardize and streamline operational 
aspects of health care equipment. These norms have 
weaker binding effect, and courts do not require 
compliance, but they may have significant impact 
on accessing health services. For example, one of 
the major issues regarding access to legal abortion 
in cases of rape refers to the hospitals requiring 
a police report; a technical norm issued by the 
Ministry of Health regulated the dismissal of this 
requirement. 
Technical norms, decisions, and bills repre-
sent a political and legal resource, as well as a tactic 
for framing public issues. Although constrained by 
rules of enunciation within the state bureaucracy, 
these official documents are taken here as formal 
translations of the political dispute, supported by 
state alliances and negotiations and framed by 
moral, scientific, and legal arguments. 
To map the legal battle between movement and 
counter-movement in the state arenas, we created 
two databases: one populated with administrative 
actions of the federal executive branch (including 
decrees, ordinances, resolutions, technical norms, 
plans, and internalization of international docu-
ments), and another populated with actions taken 
by political parties and members of Congress in-
side the federal legislative branch (bills of law and 
constitutional amendments with their respective 
justifications). Although the collected data covers 
the period between 1989 and 2015, we refer in this 
text only to 50 bills, which were presented between 
1995–2006. 
FHC government (1995–2002)   
During FHC’s government (1995–2002), the Minis-
try of Health began to produce technical norms for 
regulation of legal abortion services in the public 
health system. While the 1940 penal law formally 
provided for legal abortion, there were many diffi-
culties for people accessing it, especially for those 
relying on the public health system. In the absence 
of a federal norm, the provision of abortion services 
depended on the regulation of each hospital or state 
and municipal ordinances. 26
The mobilization to implement legal abortion 
services in the public health system occurred in a fa-
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vorable alliance between feminists and progressive 
doctors, allocated especially in the Brazilian Feder-
ation of Gynecology and Obstetrics (FEBRASGO).27 
In 1998, the Technical Norm for the Prevention 
and Treatment of Injuries Resulting from Sexual 
Violence against Women and Adolescents was 
published. This was the first time the Ministry of 
Health regulated legal abortion in the nationwide 
public system. The regulation of the provision of 
legal abortion services in public hospitals was part 
of a broader package of measures for female victims 
of violence. This strategy of regulating access to le-
gal abortion due to rape indication finally made it 
possible to implement legal abortion services. 
At the end of the 1990s, only eight hospitals were 
performing legal abortion; in the 2000s, there were 
44.28 This was far below demand, not even consid-
ering unequal regional distribution (hospitals were 
highly concentrated in southeast Brazil), but the cre-
ation of technical norms represented a victory for the 
movement. In reaction, anti-abortion groups began 
to pressure professionals in the Technical Area for 
Women’s Health to repeal the norm, on the grounds 
that the norm would facilitate access to abortion for 
women who were not victims of violence.29 After the 
publication of the technical norm, Congressman 
Severino Cavalcanti, author of two proposals for 
anti-abortion constitutional amendments, presented 
a bill aiming to block its application. 
Indeed, in this period we observed an increase 
in congressional opposition to abortion. Between 
1989–1994, eight anti-abortion bills were proposed, 
as opposed to 14 pro-choice bills. Between 1995 and 
2003, anti-abortion bills outweighed the pro-choice 
projects, with a total of 13 anti-abortion projects 
and 6 pro-choice projects.
The pro-choice movement sought to expand 
its support base focusing on the implementation of 
legal abortion.30 The battle for broad decriminal-
ization of abortion was central to the pro-choice 
agenda during the Constitutional Assembly and the 
years following it, but this strategy became less im-
portant in the 1990s. Between 1989 and 1994, there 
were six pro-choice bills opposing criminalization. 
From 1995 to 2002, five pro-choice bills advocated 
broadening the specific cases of legal abortion or 
its regulations, while only one was directed at de-
criminalization. This relationship worsened in the 
following years.
Among the anti-abortion bills in this period, 
other regulatory strategies besides criminalization 
and increasing punishment start to appear. Of the 
13 anti-abortion bills presented between 1995 and 
2002, four were related to the increase of criminal-
ization or punishment, four aimed at broadening 
the rights of the fetus, and three proposed the pro-
hibition of research on embryos. One bill sought to 
broaden doctors’ right to refuse to perform legal 
abortion, and another created a symbolic date, a 
day of homage to the “unborn child”. 
The end of the FHC government was high-
lighted by two actions by the pro-choice movement 
within the institutional field, aiming to extend the 
right to abortion. The first involved a draft of a pe-
nal code revision. Thanks to parliamentary allies, 
the Penal Code Review Commission forwarded 
to the Ministry of Justice a document outlining 
broadened permissions for abortion if the fetus 
had “serious and irreversible abnormalities.” The 
then Justice Minister Jose Carlos Dias was in fa-
vor of revising the penal code, the reform did not 
advance. Secondly, pro-choice activists succeeded 
with the Second National Plan for Human Rights 
(PNDH II), approved in 2002, with the mention 
of the need for “extensions for permission to the 
practice of legal abortion in accordance with the 
commitments undertaken by the Brazilian govern-
ment, in the framework of the Beijing platform of 
action.” This demand, however, would depend on 
legislative changes. Although there was intense 
mobilization in the legislative arena, the pro-choice 
and anti-abortion advocates were deadlocked, and 
most bills never became the legal standard. 
The alliance movement and government: 
Lula’s first presidential term (2003-2006)  
Lula’s government reshaped the way social move-
ments interact with the state. A closer and more 
organic relation was created through the imple-
mentation of national conferences and policy 
councils, boards of mixed composition (state actors 
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and civil society), with a fundamental role in the 
formulation of strategies and proposals for the 
implementation of public policies.31 In the field of 
sexual and reproductive policies, it expanded the 
reach of the pro-choice movement within the state 
bureaucracy itself: in 2003, the Special Secretary for 
Women appointed Maria José de Oliveira Araújo 
to oversee women’s health within the Ministry of 
Health. At that time, she was already a key pro-
choice activist, having helped found the Coletivo 
Feminista Sexualidade e Saúde (Feminist Collective 
of Health and Sexuality), the National Feminist 
Network for Health and Sexual and Reproductive 
Rights, and the drafting of the Program for Inte-
grated Women’s Health Care (Paism).32 
In this environment, the pro-choice move-
ment increased activity between its own networks 
and state structures, benefiting from its ability to 
employ people in government positions rather than 
just alliances.
Comparing the institutional mobilization in 
the legislative and executive branches during FHC’s 
two terms and Lula’s first term, there is a general 
increase in state mobilization addressing abortion, 
particularly in the executive branch: there were 27 
bills proposed and five acts of the executive branch 
under FHC, and 35 bills and 16 acts of the executive 
branch in Lula’s first term. 
The Ministry of Health, from 2004 on, made 
a concentrated effort to implement a national pol-
icy of assistance for women’s health, which would 
involve care for domestic and sexual violence, 
consequences resulting from illegal abortion, 
and implementation of legal abortion services.33 
In 2004, the technical area for women’s health of 
the Ministry of Health published two documents: 
the National Policy for Comprehensive Women’s 
Health Care: Principles and Guidelines and the 
National Policy for Comprehensive Women’s 
Health Care: Action Plan 2004–2007. These include 
an assessment of the (low) implementation of care 
services to women in situations of violence and the 
provision of strategies to intervene, such as increas-
ing the number of clinics offering legal abortion; 
revising technical norms for legal abortion; train-
ing; and policies for humanized care for women 
suffering the consequences of unsafe abortions. As 
part of this national policy, increased distribution 
of the “morning after pill” generated intense public 
debate, which was accompanied by the initiative of 
counter groups to stop the distribution of this pill 
via legislative bills. 
In 2005, the Ministry of Health issued other 
technical norms that advanced implementation of 
the right to legal abortion. Among the pro-choice 
victories, these norms revoked the requirement that 
a hospital be given a police report before providing 
abortion in case of rape, and created an obligation 
for the National Health System to perform legal 
abortions in such instances.34 Removing the police 
report requirement was one of the most controver-
sial issues; it raised so much opposition that even a 
Supreme Court justice publicly advised doctors not 
to follow the administrative regulations.
Meanwhile, the Rede Feminista de Saúde 
(Feminist Health Network) in 2004 launched the 
campaign Jornadas Brasileiras pelo Aborto Le-
gal e Seguro (Brazilian Efforts for Legal and Safe 
Abortion), which culminated in the organized 
participation of the movement in the First National 
Conference on Women’s Policies, convened by the 
federal government. The National Policy Plan for 
Women was prepared at this conference, and ex-
pressed the need to “review the legislation dealing 
with abortion.”
Based on the conference resolution and on the 
National Policy Plan for Women, the federal govern-
ment drove the abortion agenda in the legislature. 
In 2005, the special secretary for women’s policies 
established a tripartite commission, with repre-
sentatives from the executive branch, civil society, 
and the legislative branch itself in order to revise 
abortion legislation. The commission sent congress a 
bill decriminalizing abortion up to the twelfth week 
of pregnancy.35 This was arguably the moment that 
decriminalization came closest to approval. But in 
Lula’s second term, after a religious offensive, the 
executive branch removed their support and the 
project was halted in the House of Representatives. 
Between 2004 and 2005, pro-choice members 
of congress proposed four bills aiming to broaden 
specific permissions for abortion. The bills rein-
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forced the legislative strategy of the movement to 
invest more in projects that expand or regulate the 
cases of legal abortion, to the detriment of those 
cases decriminalizing abortion more broadly. 
This was already the goal of pro-choice legislative 
disputes: pro-choice legal frames in the FHC era 
involved only one bill aiming at decriminalization/
reduction of punishment, while five bills focused 
on increasing indications and regulating legal 
abortion access. 
On the other hand, the high number of an-
ti-abortion bills in the first Lula government shows 
that the countermobilization intensified in response 
to the pro-choice movement’s increased influence 
in the executive branch. For example, as a direct 
response to the Ministry of Health technical norm 
regulating distribution of the “morning-after pill,” 
a bill was proposed that prohibited its distribution.
Number of pro-choice and anti-abortion 
bills, 1995-2006
The anti-abortion bills during Lula’s first adminis-
tration did not just surpass the number introduced 
during the FHC years; they also had diversified legal 
frameworks (See Table 1 and Figure 1). They sought 
to keep and even expand criminalization (for ex-
ample, with the proposal to ban any kind of right 
to abortion, including in exceptional cases) but 
state control of the woman’s body took other forms. 
For example, some bills proposed the creation of a 
hotline to report abortion cases to the police, and a 
mandatory pregnancy registration. More proposals 
sought to expand the rights of the fetus. The rhetoric 
of protection, which the anti-abortion movement 
was already using to frame the protection of the 
fetus, was then used also to protect women through 
bills ranging from abortion prevention programs 
to social assistance programs for women wishing 
to proceed with a pregnancy resulting from rape. 
Although these proposals focused on women wish-
ing to keep their pregnancies, the anti-abortion 
movement began to dispute with the pro-choice 
movement the defense of the interests of women.
Anti-abortion legal frames in the legislative 
bills  
The pro-choice and anti-abortion battle inside the 
state arenas led to some moderation in the framing 
Figure 1. Number of pro-choice and anti-abortion bills, 1995-2006
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processes on both sides. On the pro-choice side, 
the most radical agenda for decriminalization of 
abortion gave way to a more moderate agenda for 
abortion regulations, as outlined by the Brazilian 
legislation via public policies on women health 
and sexual violence, or through the expansion of 
specific legal cases. On the anti-abortion side, the 
language of social and human rights was incor-
porated selectively into its agenda: going beyond 
repression, this tactic aimed at proactive solutions 
of state policies for women deciding not to undergo 
abortion. This shift in the conservative activism 
tending to frame their discourse in the language 
of rights, public policy and protection of women 
is recognized as a tendency in Latin America and 
is also an example of the dynamics between move-
ment and counter-movement as a game of reaction, 
neutralization, and adaptation of strategies.36 
Conservative reaction, political crisis, and 
broken alliances     
The last two years of Lula’s first term changed the 
opportunities and restrictions for movement and 
counter-movement. Among the legislative pro-
posals between 2003 and 2006, a sharp reversal 
occurred in 2005. While legislative proposals favor-
able to the pro-choice agenda prevailed until 2004, 
anti-abortion proposals dominated from 2005. 
This reversal began with the report of an alleged 
political corruption scheme involving vote-buying 
of congressional members. The political scandal, 
known as Mensalão, led to a government crisis in 
2005 and 2006, undermining the government’s 
congressional support and lowering the president’s 
popularity. It also contributed to a retreat in pro-
choice policies, which gained wide public attention 
and generated opposition in the public opinion. 
The weakening of the government, combined 
with the approach of the 2006 presidential and con-
gressional elections, generated oppositional impact 
in regard to the abortion agenda. Facing political 
and electoral damage due to this agenda, Lula’s gov-
ernment stepped back from pro-choice initiatives 
and sought support from the CNBB, a traditional 
basis of the Workers’ Party (PT) political support, 
and evangelical representatives in Congress.
The bill created in the 2005 tripartite com-
mission, which proposed the decriminalization of 
abortion and its legalization through regulatory 
compliance in the public health system, sparked 
the formation of I Frente Parlamentar em Defesa da 
Vida: Contra o Aborto (First Parliamentary Front 
for Defense of Life: Against Abortion). The group 
promoted the First National Seminar on Defense 
of Life in 2005, which orchestrated meetings among 
local pro-life groups.37 The countermobilization that 
began in congress resulted in the formation of the 
Movimento Nacional da Cidadania pela Vida: Bra-
sil sem Aborto (National Movement of Citizenship 
Legal frame FHC
(1995-2002)
Lula
(2003-2006)
Increase criminalization/punishment 4 7
Increase choice for doctors 1 0
Institution of symbolic day 1 0
Protection of life since conception/increased rights of fetus 4 3
Prohibit embryo research 3 0
Broaden women’s rights 0 3
Increase control over women’s bodies 0 2
Prohibit emergency contraception 0 2
Table 1. Anti-abortion legal frames in the legislative bills
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for Life: Brazil without Abortion) in 2006, which 
convened state committees that brought together 
previously disparate organizations and movements.38 
The simultaneous launch of the movement 
through the Manifesto à Nação (Manifesto to the 
Nation) and the Campanha Nacional em Defesa 
da Vida (National Campaign in Defense of Life), 
connected, for the first time in Brazil, congress and 
the anti-abortion movement’s network. In the 2006 
elections, marches occurred throughout the coun-
try, with slogans such as “For a congress in defense 
of life,” “Decide for life: vote for candidates who are 
against abortion,” and “Yes life. Abortion never!”39
The conservative reaction to the abortion 
agenda was consolidated with the increased 
evangelical presence in congress after 2006. The 
“evangelical caucus” led pressure for the revision of 
technical standards and proposed projects seeking 
to impede or prohibit access to legal abortion. One 
key proposal was for the “statute of the unborn 
child,” which sought to revoke the cases of legal 
abortion already in the penal code. 
In a context of anti-abortion political pressure 
towards law enforcement agents, police depart-
ments and prosecutors’ offices launched an offensive 
against clinics performing clandestine abortions. 
Most strikingly, a medical clinic in Campo Grande, 
Mato Grosso do Sul, was forced to close in 2007, and 
police investigated all clinic patients and medical 
staff. More than 10,000 women had their medical 
records confiscated and privacy invaded. At least 25 
women were charged and served time in prison for 
the crime of abortion.40 In 2009, a case involving 
the legal abortion to be performed on a 9-year-old 
victim of sexual abuse also received great attention 
from the media. After pressure from anti-abortion 
groups, especially the Catholic Church, the hospital 
and doctors refused to perform a legal abortion, 
which was only possible after the intervention of 
the Federal Secretariat for Women and the Public 
Prosecutor Office.41 
Meanwhile, a battle occurred in the Supreme 
Court with two public hearings, one on biosecurity 
and the other on the anencephalic fetus. 
The wave of institutional pro-choice activities 
culminated in the approval of the biosafety law in 
2005 that allowed and regulated embryo research. 
The battle continued as a constitutional challenge of 
the law in the federal Supreme Court, proposed by 
the state attorney general, on the grounds that the 
law would contradict the principle of inviolability 
of the right to life that, according to his argument, 
exists since the moment of fertilization. In April 
2007, a public hearing was installed by the Supreme 
Court, gathering two sides in opposing: pro-life 
movement versus scientists’ pro-embryo research 
together with pro-choice activists. The pro-life 
judicial claim was dismissed in May 2008, again 
preventing the protection of life since conception 
to enter the Brazilian regulatory framework, this 
time through a Supreme Court interpretation of 
the constitutional right to life. 
The anencephalic fetus case was proposed 
by the pro-choice movement in 2004 (after a first 
attempt in 2003). In July 2004, the Supreme Court 
granted a preliminary injunction allowing the pro-
cedure to be performed until the merits of the case 
were judged. The full court revoked the injunction 
months later, and the case was shelved until 2008, 
when a public hearing gave greater public visibility 
to the movement and counter-movement battle, the 
greatest since the constituent assembly. In 2008, the 
Supreme Court held four sessions of public hearings 
on the anencephalic fetus case involving 27 partic-
ipants to defend views for or against the request. 
Participants included religious organizations, 
feminist organizations, professional associations, 
government representatives, and individual actors 
(such as doctors and members of congress). The 
tense nature of the ethical-moral conflict and the 
mobilization around the issue itself attracted media 
coverage and public interest. The trial was delayed 
four more years, but the Supreme Court finally rec-
ognized the claim in 2012.
While these two judicial decisions showed a 
context of positive political opportunities for the 
pro-choice movement in the Supreme Court, the 
alliance of feminists with the Workers’ Party (PT) 
government ended with their definitive political 
and public retreat from the issue. In 2009, follow-
ing political pressure, the Secretary for Human 
Rights removed public commitment to decrim-
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inalize abortion from the Third National Human 
Rights Plan.42 In the 2010 election campaign, 
abortion was again a central issue. Dilma Rousseff, 
who had throughout her political career supported 
legalizing abortion, pledged in her “Open Letter to 
the People of God” not to take measures toward 
legalizing abortion if she were elected, a pledge that 
she fulfilled during her two terms (2011–2014 and 
2015–2016).
Conclusion
This article proposes a relational approach to the 
study of abortion law reform in Brazil. We focus 
on the interaction of pro-choice and anti-abortion 
movements between different state arenas and po-
litical contexts. To analyze the disputes in the state 
areas, and the strategies used by the two move-
ments, one has to consider that battles over abortion 
regulation are formalized through legislative bills, 
norms of public policies issued by the executive 
branch, and judicial decisions. They are different 
political resources for mobilization, with different 
degrees of authoritative force, which also impacts 
strategies. Technical norms serve as guidelines for 
public policy and are not binding, but legitimize 
and strengthen the decisions of public officials. 
However, they are limited political resources, 
unstable and susceptible to revisions by the gov-
ernment when faced with pressure from opposition 
groups. From the moment those technical norms 
become law, however, they are no longer subject to 
the inclinations of the public administrator and, in 
addition, courts can require compliance. This helps 
to explain why disputes in the legislative arena were 
responsive to government regulation. In this sense, 
although the executive branch as an ally was key 
to implement public policies by increasing access 
to legal abortion, the legislative arena was crucial 
for the pro-choice movement to solidify it and 
for the counter-movement to block it. A Supreme 
Court decision, in turn, although limited to formal 
frameworks and requirements of access, has the 
authoritative force to remove a piece of legislation 
or interpret it in an innovative way due to claims 
based on unconstitutionality. Although allies from 
the pro-choice and anti-abortion movements have 
proposed many bills in congress, they haven’t ad-
vanced to change the prohibition standard. The 
only change in the prohibitions framework since 
1940 came from the Federal Supreme Court, in its 
decision on the case regarding the anencephalic 
fetus in 2012, which allowed for termination of 
pregnancy in these cases.
Retracing the political process on abortion in 
Brazil, we showed that the movement and count-
er-movement dynamics between the executive and 
the legislative branches during two governments 
that progressively opened space to the pro-choice 
movement, FHC (1995–2002) and Lula’s first term 
(2003–2006), is key to understanding the backlash 
against the pro-choice agenda after 2006. 
The first generation of Brazilian pro-choice 
activists advanced strategies in the occupation of 
the state. Political opportunity seized by the two 
governments intensified the connections between 
pro-choice movement and the state, resulting in ad-
vances in the regulation of access to legal abortion 
services. Offensives launched by the existing pro-
choice agenda were decisive in terms of creating a 
perception of threat to the anti-abortion movement: 
pro-choice regulations were issued within the Min-
istry of Health, the legislative branch regulated 
embryo research (2005), and a bill decriminalizing 
abortion advanced with the support of the exec-
utive branch, with strong participation from the 
pro-choice movement. 
The counter-movement responded by in-
creasing activity in congress and mobilizing in the 
public sphere. To understand how abortion came 
to be a key issue to the anti-abortion movement in 
the electoral campaigns, it is important to mention 
that abortion rights policies traditionally raise op-
position in the public sphere, led by the Catholic 
Church and pro-life groups, and public opinion 
is often divided. Recent research shows that most 
Brazilians approve legalizing abortion in cases of 
rape, risk to the life of the mother, and non-viability 
of the fetus, but the majority does not support com-
plete legalization.43 
Our analysis shows that the political context 
in the FHC and Lula eras is key to understanding 
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the migration of the dispute to the Supreme Court 
and the public arenas in the ensuing years. 
Part of the pro-choice movement explored 
the Constitutional Court as an escape route to 
legislative disputes. Three positive decisions for 
the pro-choice movement (the biosafety law case in 
2008, the anencephalic fetus case in 2012, and the 
concession in 2016 of a habeas corpus considering 
unconstitutional the pre-trial prison of two doctors 
accused of abortion) showed political opportuni-
ties for the pro-choice agenda in the court. Two 
cases are still pending there: the Zika infection case 
from 2016 (demanding authorization to proceed to 
abortion in case of microcephaly of the fetus) and 
the most recent one, filed in March 2017, finally 
addressing decriminalization until 12 weeks. After 
the political backlash, the Supreme Court appears 
to be the sole institutional arena still receptive to 
the pro-choice movement.
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